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This paper investigates the influence populist parties exert on other political parties and the 
party system. Undertaking a national qualitative case studies analysis, we tested four 
hypotheses: representation gap hypothesis (populist parties pursue a strategy that is designed 
to exploit gaps of representation by means of emphasizing new or re-vitalizing old conflicts); 
contagion hypothesis (the rise of populist parties is accompanied with an overall diffusion of 
populist ideas in the policy agenda of non-populist parties); polarization hypothesis (the rise of 
populist parties makes party systems more acutely polarised) and elective affinity coalition 
hypothesis (populist parties enter governing coalitions with other populist parties and also with 
non-populist parties if the latter also employ at least one of the typical themes of populist 
discourse, e.g., nationalist, nativist, anti-establishment, Eurosceptic themes). Results support 
the representation gap hypothesis: with the populists’ electoral success, they represent new 
issues in parliament. Concerning the contagion hypothesis, case studies offered mixed results: 
in some countries contagion can be observed, while not in others. As for the polarization 
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To fully understand and assess importance of populist presence in Europe is important to focus 
on the impact of populism on party systems in selected European countries. The analysis seeks 
to test the following hypotheses: representation gap hypothesis (populist parties pursue a 
strategy that is designed to exploit gaps of representation by means of emphasizing new or re-
vitalizing old conflicts); contagion hypothesis (the rise of populist parties is accompanied with 
an overall diffusion of populist ideas in the policy agenda of non-populist parties); polarization 
hypothesis (the rise of populist parties makes party systems more acutely polarized); elective 
affinity coalition hypothesis (populist parties enter governing coalitions with other populist 
parties and also with non-populist parties if the latter also employ at least one of the typical 
themes of populist discourse, e.g., nationalist, nativist, anti-establishment, Eurosceptic 
themes). 
Our analysis begins with providing a theoretical starting point for our analysis of the influence 
of populist parties on the party systems of selected countries. The basic hypothesis is that 
parties and party systems have a direct influence on the form and function, and sometimes the 
disfunction, of a democracy. To address the issue, we must first devise an appropriate typology 
of party systems and define each type, with attention to the potential that each one has for 
contributing to better or worse conditions for democracy. We can then analyse the role of 
populist parties and assess the degree to which they can influence a party system and cause it 
to change from one type to another, based on case studies of selected countries.1 
Our theoretical framework will be based on the typology of party systems devised by Giovanni 
Sartori and elaborated by Steven B. Wolinetz. Sartori’s interest in political parties and party 
systems focused mainly on the practical context, that is, whether the democracies in which they 
operated functioned or failed to function. He was concerned mainly with his native Italy 
(Beyme 2019: 69; Pasquino 2009: 172), and his theory of parties and party systems to some 
extent is based on this national context (especially the polarized pluralism). Sartori (1987a; 
1987b) was an important theoretician of competitive democracy, which cannot function 
without political parties: ‘Sartori’s ideal of democracy was a “democracy of parties”, built on 
the awareness that parties are the essential to democracy (…)’ (Pasquino 2019: 17).  
                                                 
1 Download the case studies from the DEMOS cloud system: 
https://file.tk.mta.hu/index.php/s/toANiyAn8sYYGkM 




In the first part of this paper, we will present basic classifications and typologies of party 
systems and discuss the main approaches to classifying them that have been adopted. We will 
also review Giovanni Sartori’s own classification and typology of party systems. Then we will 
present the newer typology of party systems devised by Steven B. Wolinetz, which takes 
Sartori’s typology and develops it further. In the next part we focus on the party system known 
as polarized pluralism, which is the most interesting and most frequently analysed type of 
system in Sartori’s typology — and which has the most influence on the functioning and 
survival of democracy. The key element of polarized pluralism is the phenomenon of anti-
system parties, to which we will devote the next part of the paper. We will present Sartori’s 
concept of the anti-system party, and also its modification by Giovanni Capoccia and Mattia 
Zulianello, followed by a short summary of the interrelationships between polarization, anti-
systemness, and democracy.  
In the second part, we will present the basic questions to be answered using our case studies. 
In the course of answering those questions, we will evaluate the influence of populist parties 
on party systems and on democratic regimes as such. We will conclude our analysis by 
presenting results from eight selected case studies (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain). 
2. Party Systems and Their Classification and Typology 
Political parties and party systems are the keys to understanding what modern democratic 
regimes are and how they function – or in some cases, do not function. That is the premise on 
which the classic studies of political parties of Maurice Duverger are based. Duverger 
identified certain types of party systems while distinguishing between various types of political 
regimes. (Duverger 1951: 388). He was the first modern author who created a complex theory 
of parties and party systems that included an extensive and sophisticated typology of party 
systems (1951; 1960; 1966). Unfortunately, Duverger’s typology is not well known. (Some of 
his most important texts on the subject remain untranslated from their original French.) Only 
his simple classification of party systems, which is based on one criterion, number of parties, 
is generally recognized. This classification reflected the commonly accepted simple distinction 
between single-party system, two-party system, and multi-party system, and when limited to 
democracies, between two-party system and multi-party system only (Mair 1997: 200–202). 
Nevertheless, this very basic classification has gained a central role in the study of party 




systems because it provides a starting point for other typologies that take into account other 
criteria than simply the number of parties. 
Simply put, the other typologies of party systems have advanced in two directions. In the first 
case, the criterion of the number of parties was supplemented by the criteria of their strength 
(electoral or parliamentary), and their position on the spectrum of the party system. The classic 
example of this approach was Jean Blondel (1968: 184–189) who distinguished between 1) 
two-party system 2) two-and-a-half-party system, 3) multi-party system with a dominant party, 
and 4) multi-party system without a dominant party. ‘Modern’ authors who followed Blondel’s 
lead include Gordon Smith (1986), Alan J. Ware (1996), and especially, Alan Siaroff (2000; 
2003; 2006). 
The second approach to creating a typology of party systems adds the element of polarization, 
that is, the ideological distance between parties, to that of the number of parties. This is the 
direction taken by the second most important modern theoretician of parties and party systems 
after Duverger – Giovanni Sartori (1976) – who was later followed by Steven B. Wolinetz 
(2004; 2006). While Duverger’s sophisticated typology of party systems is not, as we have 
mentioned above, very well-known today, ‘Sartori’s imposing construction’ (l’imposant 
édifice de Sartori (Duverger 1981: 8)) has become the most celebrated typology of party 
systems ever. To this day it has not been surpassed and according to some authors, it never will 
be (Pasquino 2005; 2009). Therefore, we pay Sartori’s typology the most attention, in part 
because it is so closely connected with the question of the functioning or non-functioning of 
the democratic regimes in which populist parties are playing an important role today. 
2.1 Classes and Types of Party Systems According to Giovanni Sartori 
Sartori’s theory of party systems is one of the most well-known and most influential of any that 
he wrote. The classification and typology of party systems occupies a central position in it. 
They are not the same: ‘A classification is an ordering based on mutually exclusive classes that 
are established by the principle, or criterion, chosen for that classification. A typology is a more 
complex matter: it is an ordering of “attribute compounds,” i.e., an ordering resulting from 
more than one criterion’ (Sartori 2005: 110). 
What does that mean when applied to the classification and typology of party systems? The 
key thing is distinguishing between ‘format’ and ‘mechanics’. A format is a static variable or 
snapshot of the number of parties in a system: how many are there? Mechanics is a dynamic 




variable (how the system works) that expresses the influence of ideology. Here it is necessary 
to differentiate between democracies and dictatorships. In a dictatorship it is the intensity of an 
ideology that is important, while in a democracy, it is polarization, that is, the ideological 
distance between parties. The classification of party systems is based only on format, that is, 
the number of parties, and leads to the identification of classes. By contrast, the typology of a 
party system is based on a combination of format (the number of parties) and mechanism (the 
intensity of ideology, or polarization) and leads to the identification of types. Sartori (2005: 
110) identified seven classes of party systems: 1) one party, 2) hegemonic party, 3) 
predominant party, 4) two party, 5) limited pluralism, 6) extreme pluralism and 7) atomized. 
While the first two classes are non-competitive (monocentric), the others are competitive 
(pluralistic) party systems.  
The two classes of non-competitive party systems can be differentiated as follows, based on 
the intensity of ideology. Depending on the intensity of ideology (from the greatest to the least), 
the one-party system presents as a) a type with one totalitarian party, b) a type with one 
authoritarian party, or c) a type with one pragmatic party. Again, depending on the intensity of 
ideology, a hegemonic-party system presents as one of two types: a) a type with a hegemonic 
ideological party or b) a type with a hegemonic pragmatic party (Sartori 2005: 254). 
As far as competitive (pluralistic) party systems are concerned, Sartori expressly differentiates 
between class and type only in the cases of limited and extreme pluralism, as shown in the 
following schematic diagram: 
Schematic Diagram 1: Classes and Types of Pluralism According to Sartori 
 Format       Class   Mechanics    Type 
 
few parties           limited pluralism  +      low polarization                moderate pluralism
 
many parties           extreme pluralism +      high polarization               polarized pluralism
 
Source: the authors. 
The other classes (predominant-party systems, two-party systems, and atomized systems) can 
also be types as well. Sartori never states this directly, but it can be inferred from his ‘typology 
of party polities’ (Sartori 2005: 252–254), and it is also implicit in the characteristics of those 
party systems. This is especially true of two-party systems (twopartism). Twopartism, as 
Sartori conceives of it, presumes the existence not only of a two-party format, but also a bipolar 




mechanics. If twopartism results in the regular alternation of two parties in power, then we can 
assume there is a centripetal tendency in politics, that is, a low degree of polarization. In every 
case, twopartism is both a class and a type of party system. One can also consider systems with 
a predominant party and atomized systems in the same way, although of course with different 
formats and mechanics. 
2.2 Steven B. Wolinetz’ Typology of Party Systems 
Steven B. Wolinetz (2004; 2006) built upon Sartori’s typology of party systems by adding a 
new criterium to the criteria of fragmentation and polarization, which is a form of competition. 
He also distinguished degrees of polarization according to its intensity. The form of 
competition can be 1) unimodal, 2) bipolar, or 3) multipolar. The degree of polarization can be 
1) minimal, 2) moderate, 3) greater, or 4) extreme.  
If we combine the criteria of fragmentation and degree of polarization (see Table 1 below), we 
derive three basic types of party systems: 1) two party systems, 2) limited multipartyism, and 
3) extended multipartyism. A limited multipartyism can demonstrate minimal or greater 
polarization (but not extreme polarization, for which Wolinetz presents no examples). 
Extended multipartyism can demonstrate all the degrees of polarization, although minimal 
polarization would be a rather exceptional phenomenon. Like the two-party system, an 
extended multipartyism would only rarely exhibit extreme polarization. 
Table 1: Fragmentation and Degree of Polarization  
 Two party system Limited multipartyism Extended multipartyism 
Degree of polarization Minimal x x x 
Moderate x x x 
Greater x x x 
Extreme x – x 
Source: Derived from Wolinetz 2004: 21–22. 
If we add the form of competition to the fragmentation and degree of polarization, we can 
distinguish five subtypes of limited multipartyism and extended multipartyism (see Table 2). 
Limited multipartyism can appear in two variants with either unimodal or bipolar competition, 
and extended multipartyism in three variants, with unimodal, bipolar, or multipolar 
competition. In other words, limited multipartyism does not exhibit multipolar competition (in 
no case). Likewise, Wolinetz assumes that none of the five subtypes of limited and extended 
multipartyism will exhibit a minimal degree of polarization (and he gives no examples of that). 




A moderate degree of polarization is possible for all five subtypes, as is a greater degree of 
polarization with the exception of a multipartyism with unimodal competition. An extreme 
degree of polarization will be found only in a multipartyism with multipolar competition.  
Table 2: Fragmentation, Degree of Polarization and Form of Competition 





Form of Competition   Unimodal Bipolar Unimodal Bipolar Multipolar 
Degree of 
Polarization 
Minimal x – – – – – 
Moderate x x x x x x 
Greater x x x – x x 
Extreme x – – – – x 
Source: Derived from Wolinetz 2004: 21–22. 
2.3 Polarized Pluralism 
Many authors consider the type of polarized pluralism to be the most interesting and most 
original of all the system types proposed by Sartori’s theory of party systems. (Daalder 1983; 
Hanning 1984; Sani 2005; Ventura 2016; Vitiello 1981). According to Wolinetz’s typology of 
party systems, extended multipartyism with an extreme degree of polarization and a multipolar 
form of competition best correlates with Sartori’s polarized pluralism. 
In its earliest conception, polarized pluralism was characterized by three main elements: 1) a 
multipolar (specifically, tripolar) arrangement of parties, 2) centrifugal party competition, and 
3) polarized (as opposed to moderate) politics (Sartori 1966). In later versions of his work, 
Sartori outlined eight main characteristics of polarized pluralism: 1) presence of relevant anti-
system parties, 2) existence of opposition parties at each end of the ideological spectrum 
(bilateral oppositions), 3) a central ideological position occupied by one party or a group of 
parties, 4) high polarization (ideological distance between parties), 5) prevalence of centrifugal 
drivers over centripetal ones, 6) ideological patterning, 7) presence of irresponsible 
oppositions, 8) a politics in which parties attempt to outbid each other in pursuit of voters’ 
favour (Sartori 2005: 117–123).  
Polarized pluralism is thus a type of party system that is characterized by a large number of 
relevant political parties (more than 5 or 6; 6–8 according to Wolinetz) and a high degree of 
polarization (ideological distance between parties). A centrifugal tendency in politics can be 
presumed in that case. That arises from the presence of anti-system parties and bilateral 
oppositions, while pro-system parties occupy the centre of the left-right spectrum. Therefore, 




alternation of pro-system leftist and pro-system rightist parties cannot happen. The bipolarity 
of the party system is disrupted, and it becomes multipolar. 
In contrast, moderate pluralism is characterized by 1) lower number of relevant parties (less 
then 5 or 6; 3–5 according Wolinetz), 2) relatively small ideological distance between relevant 
parties, that is, a low degree of polarization, 3) bipolar coalition governments, and 4) centripetal 
competition (Sartori 2005: 159). 
2.4 Anti-System Parties 
The key to understanding polarized pluralism is the concept of the anti-system party. This is 
the concept that has drawn the most criticism (see Beyme 1987; Keren 2000; Smith 1987) and 
that has been little defended or reconceptualized (see Capoccia 2002; Zulianello 2018).  
Giovanni Sartori distinguishes between broad and strict (narrow) definitions of antisystem 
parties. In the broader conception, he views them as parties that are characterized by a wide 
spectrum of dissenting political positions: from ‘alienation’ from and total refusal of the system 
to ‘protest’ (Sartori 2005: 117). On the other hand, in the narrow conception, the definition of 
an antisystem party is founded on ideological factors. This means that an antisystem party 
upholds a dissident or alienated ideology, ‘a belief system that does not share the values of the 
political order in which it operates’ (Sartori 2005: 118). The objective of a party so conceived 
is not a change of government, but the change of the entire political system in accord with its 
own alienated ideology. This is therefore a much more steady and intensive rejection of the 
existing system than in the first case. Without regard to this distinction, anti-system parties, 
whether in the broader or narrower sense, have one thing in common: a delegitimizing 
influence. That means that they question the legitimacy of the political system to which they 
are opposed and undermine its foundations. The tactics adopted by an anti-system party are not 
particularly important. It does not have to be a revolutionary party, at least not in the strict 
sense of that word. An anti-system party can be truly revolutionary, in that it is actually 
preparing a revolution or some kind of coup against the state with the goal of overthrowing the 
existing regime, or it can be ‘revolutionary’ only in its rhetoric, meaning that it talks about a 
revolution, but that is all. Sartori of course equates this revolutionary rhetoric with a 
delegitimizing influence. A difference between anti-system parties and truly revolutionary 
parties flows from that. A truly revolutionary party ‘is surely anti-system, but the obverse is 
not true’ (Sartori 2005: 118). It is not important whether the party’s goal (which can be a 




revolution) is realizable or not, because the existence of its goal and the difficulty or absolute 
impossibility of attaining it are two different things. It is enough that the party’s goal with 
regard to the system is delegitimizing it: if so, it is an anti-system party.  
Two authors who have tried to develop the concept of the antisystem party are linked to Sartori. 
Giovanni Capoccia (2002) differentiated between relational anti-systemness and ideological 
anti-systemness. Ideological anti-systemness more or less corresponds to Sartori’s strict 
definition of an anti-system party. Relational anti-systemness heightens polarization, carries 
with its little potential for forming coalitions, and employs populist and delegitimizing tactics 
in electoral contests. Capoccia (2002: 24) states that the ‘typical anti-system party’ is 
characterized by both of the two types of anti-systemness, while a party that exhibits only 
relational and not ideological anti-systemness is said to be ‘polarizing’. 
Mattio Zulianello (2018) applies two criteria for identifying antisystem parties, as does 
Capoccia, but somewhat different ones. The first is ideological orientation towards established 
metapolicies and the second is systemic integration. The former concept more or less 
corresponds to Sartori’s strict definition of anti-system party and Capoccia’s ideological anti-
systemness. The second criterion very generally corresponds to Capoccia’s relational anti-
systemness, but it is conceived of less in terms of ideology and more in terms of institutions. 
Simply put, this means that a party that is integrated into the system has coalition potential in 
the sense that Sartori uses the term (see footnote 2), which means that it is not isolated and has 
various relationships with pro-system parties. An anti-system party, according to Zulianello, is 
one that rejects established metapolicies and also is not integrated into the system. A party that 
rejects established metapolicies and is integrated into the system is a ‘halfway house party’. 
If we compare Capocci’s and Zulianello’s concepts with those of Sartori’s, we do not see any 
movement away from Sartori’s original conception. If Capoccia says that relational anti-
systemness reduces a party’s coalition potential and increases polarization, that does not differ 
in any way from Sartori. In the same way, the absence of systemic integration of Zulianello’s 
anti-system parties corresponds in principle to Sartori’s presumption that anti-system parties 
do not have coalitional, but only blackmail potential (see footnote 2). That is, they are isolated 
from the pro-system parties even if, as he also said, an anti-system party can operate within the 
system. To be ‘within the system’, however, does not imply cooperation with pro-system 
parties, rather that anti-system parties ‘are currently playing their games within the system, and 




according to most of its rules’ (Sartori 2005: 118). That is, they are not necessarily 
revolutionary or violent. 
2.5 Polarization, Anti-Systemness and Democracy 
Polarized and moderate pluralism, like other types of party systems identified by Sartori, are 
Weberian ‘ideal types’ (Sartori 2005: 128). Therefore, we cannot assume that actual party 
systems will correspond exactly to a given type. They will be more or less close to it. The 
important thing is, however, that the degree to which a party system approximates polarized or 
moderate pluralism will have an influence on its functioning and moreover on the functioning 
of the entire democracy. The deciding factor in this case is polarization, that is, the ideological 
distance between parties: “[t]he single best explanatory variable for stable versus unstable, 
functioning versus non-functioning, successful versus immobile, and easy versus difficult 
democracy is polarization” (Sani and Sartori 1982: 337).  
Polarization (and its degree) is closely associated with anti-systemness, and with whether the 
political opposition is pro-system or anti-system (or a halfway house party according to 
Zulianello) and in what sense. Polarization and anti-systemness are basic criteria of the 
Sartorian typology of political systems. The type of party system, whether moderate or 
polarized pluralism (or in Wolinetz’s terms limited or extended multipartyism) will have a 
basic influence on the shape and functioning of a democracy. It is evident that the foundation 
of a well-functioning democracy is the existence of moderate pluralism (limited 
multipartyism), and that polarized pluralism (extended multipartyism) hampers its functioning. 
In extreme instances, strong bilateral and antisystem oppositions can pose a mortal danger to 
democracy, as the most famous case, that of the Weimar Republic, shows. We turn therefore 
to the subjects we raised at the beginning of this analysis: a close connection between typology 
of party systems and the shape and functioning of democracy.  
To analyse the influence of populist parties on party systems, there are one main and two 
subordinate questions. The main question is this: can populist parties in the countries we 
examine become actors that will transform a system of moderate pluralism (limited 
multipartyism) into a system of polarized pluralism (extended multipartyism)? Considering the 
typology of party systems presented above, this question can be broken into two subordinate 
questions: 1) to what extent do populist parties increase the polarization of a party system, and 
2) can we identify a populist party as an anti-system party (or halfway house party) and if so, 




in what way and to what extent? The answers to these questions will be sought in our case 
studies of selected countries. 
3. The Case Studies of Party Systems 
Here we summarize our results – for the detailed analysis please consult the case studies2. The 
methodological approach characterising studies reflected in this analysis is an example of 
qualitative case study research based on the tradition of the ‘new’ institutionalism. This broad 
approach has already been applied in the analysis of political parties in previous DEMOS 
research and it has been chosen also for the analysis of party systems in selected countries in 
which political parties, including populist subjects, are actors playing a decisive influence.  
A collection of case studies, set of detailed descriptive analysis of the party systems which were 
chosen as a subject of research, served as an empirical basis for this analytical paper and aimed 
at providing a better understanding of relationship between populism and development of party 
system. It considers the overall framework of party systems – political context, classification 
of party system following the typology of Giovanni Sartori, and the role of populist parties in 
the party system. Those interpretative case studies, owing to a more profound interest in the 
cases examined, introduce theoretical notions or constructs to the analysis. While referring to 
existing hypotheses or theories, they can also be regarded as applied science studies, because 
they are concerned with interpreting or applying a generalisation to a specific case in order to 
analyse it better (Morlino 2018, 51–52). 
This research is based on a threefold criterion of increase, relative stability or decline of support 
for populist parties between two time points, 2000 and 2020 (based on the ‘Timbro 
Authoritarian Populism Index’). We thus discern four clusters of European democracies in 
which the support for populists varied as follows (case selection based on typical examples):  
a) Democracies in which the support for populist parties increased dramatically 
between 2000 and 2020 resulting in the rise of populist parties to government: 
Hungary, Greece, Poland. 
b) Democracies in which the support for populist parties increased between 2000 and 
2020 (but not as dramatically as in the above case): the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Spain. 
                                                 
2 Download at: https://file.tk.mta.hu/index.php/s/fsFdrkGQo4jjEDT  




c) Democracies in which the support for populist parties was stable in 2020 compared 
to 2000 (and such support was far from trivial): France.  
d) Democracies in which the support for populist parties was smaller in 2020 than in 
2000 (but was not trivial): Slovakia.  
The authors of the party systems studies were tasked to maintain a specific research structure 
based on the theory of party systems. First, they introduced political context of the country in 
question, focusing on the relevance of populist parties within the political field and their 
performance (electoral results and seats in parliaments, presence in governments / coalitions / 
or in opposition), thus analysing what role populists play in the political life of the country, to 
what extend they are successful and for how long populists’ elements are present in the political 
arena. Second, they tackled four hypotheses: 
H1: Representation gap hypothesis – If populist parties pursue a strategy that is designed to 
exploit gaps of representation by means of emphasizing new or re-vitalizing old conflicts. 
H2: Contagion hypothesis – If a rise of populist parties is accompanied with an overall 
diffusion of populist ideas in the policy agenda of non-populist parties. 
H3: Polarization hypothesis – If a rise of populist parties makes party systems more acutely 
polarized. 
H4: Elective affinity coalition hypothesis – If populist parties enter governing coalitions with 
other populist parties and also with non-populist parties and if the latter also employ at least 
one of the typical themes of populist discourse, e.g., nationalist, nativist, anti-establishment, 
Eurosceptic themes. 
Third, the authors concentrated on the impact of populist parties on changes in the political 
system. They identified types of party systems following the typology of Giovanni Sartori 
(2005) and Steven B. Wolinetz (2004, 2006), which has been described in detail in the first 
part of this analysis. The authors also analysed how the rise of populist parties changed those 
party systems and how they changed their functioning.  
As a time framework for the party systems studies we chose the rather long time period from 
2000 to 2020. It allowed us to focus on the long-term development and changes in analysed 
party systems without being too reductive – thus we could avoid short term changes caused by 




the economic crisis in 2008 or the migrant situation in 2015. However, we have decided not to 
include recent political developments in analysed countries (thus framing it by spring 2020) 
for the very same reason – one election could skew the results not to mention the current 
pandemic situation (an example of this distortion could be changes in the political map after 
the recent elections in Slovakia in 2020, but we do not know yet what impact they will have on 
the party system in a long-term perspective). 
Regarding the case selection, as mentioned above, we used the ‘Timbro Authoritarian Populism 
Index’ to identify four clusters of European democracies – 1) As cases of countries with 
dramatically increased populist support we selected Hungary (as an example of radical right-
wing ‘illiberal’ populism which has been present in government already for one decade); 
Poland (where social conservative populists also decisively influenced the party system in 
recent years); and Greece (as a country with the strongest left-wing populist and the only case 
in Europe where left-wing populists were a leading governmental party). 2) As cases of 
countries in which the support for populist parties also increased but not as dramatically, we 
selected Germany (as an example of traditionally ‘populist proof’ countries which has, 
however, experienced a steady rise in populism in the examined years); Spain (as a country in 
which populist parties are not playing the pivotal role in the political system, but the economic 
crises caused the rise of left-wing populism, which in turn led to the emergence of radical right-
wing populism); and the Czech Republic (it is a borderline case between the first two clusters 
– populist parties did not get the same level of electoral support as in Hungary or Poland, 
however, the technocratic ‘entrepreneurial’ populism of Andrej Babiš has proved to be 
effective in maintaining a strong governmental presence). 3) Countries in which the support 
for populist parties has been similar during the investigated period – we found one case for this 
category and that is France (National Front has been an important actor in the French political 
system since the early 2000s, the same is valid also for the left-wing populist actors in France). 
4) As a country in which the support for populist parties was less in 2020 than before we 
indicated Slovakia in which the influence and electoral support of Robert Fico and his allies 
was in constant decline. 
In the first chapter, Gábor Dobos identifies Hungary as a country with a certain form of a 
predominant party system, in which the dominant governing party (Fidesz) is a populist party, 
as is one of the strongest opposition parties (Jobbik). The two parties together have held around 
80 percent of the parliamentary mandates in the last decade. The author pointed out the 2010 




general elections as a crucial event regarding the rise of populism in Hungarian politics: Fidesz 
gained two-thirds of the mandates and Jobbik entered parliament. The chapter also shows that 
Hungarian populist parties have an undeniable impact on the party system: 1) They are bringing 
new themes into the political agenda, creating new and re-vitalizing old conflicts, primarily by 
feeding the ignorance and xenophobia of the Hungarian society; 2) with the rise of populist 
parties, polarization of the Hungarian political system has clearly increased – this change can 
be traced both in the voters’ and the parties’ ideological positions. Dobos concludes that despite 
the fact that populism has no direct impact on the policy agenda of non-populist parties, an idea 
transfer can be observed between the two parties, more precisely, Fidesz does not shy away 
from importing radical elements of Jobbik’s politics. 
The next chapter written by Artur Lipiński focuses on the impact of populism on the party 
system in Poland. According to the author, the Polish party system exhibits features of limited 
pluralism with strong polarization between the Law and Justice (resorting to populism at the 
discourse and agenda level) and the oppositional liberal Civic Platform. It is the competition 
between these parties that has determined the structure and content of the political competition 
already since 2005. Law and Justice was then able to impose the new division between social 
and liberal Poland which replaced the post-communist cleavage. It also proved its skilfulness 
in using the media (including social media) to disseminate the agenda of radical polity reform, 
necessity of elite replacement and perform a crisis. Lipiński concludes that PiS contributed 
strongly to the high level of polarization, introducing reforms which limit, if not destroy, the 
system of checks and balances and curtail civic freedoms. 
The case study by Manos Tsatsanis and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos deals with the Greek party 
system. According to them, the Greek party system changed dramatically because of the rise 
of populist parties of the Right and the Left. While populists were important also in the recent 
past (in 1981-1989, when Pasok had first ruled), it was particularly after the eruption of the 
Greek economic crisis that they held centre stage in the party system. The performance of the 
populist government coalition in power (the Syriza/Anel coalition in 2015-2019) at times 
bordered on intolerance and hostility towards critical media and the justice system but checks 
and balances against the populist government did not reach a breaking point. The authors 
conclude that Greek democracy was affected by the rise of populism, although it did not 
succumb to pressures emerging from different sides of the political spectrum. Despite the grave 
economic crisis of 2010 and the rise of populist parties in Greek politics, Greek democracy 




survived and withstood all economic and political blows, even though, admittedly, the social 
cost in terms of unemployment and poverty rates was very extensive. 
The following chapter, written by Hendrik Hüning, is devoted to the specific case of the 
German party system. The author focuses primarily on the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and 
its impact on the party system – since the AfD is the only relevant populist player in Germany. 
The AfD was able to fill two gaps of presentation, namely by representing Eurosceptic voters 
and voters with xenophobic and nativist positions, that explain its rapid success. Both the 
widening cultural dimension of policy issues as well as the AfD’s wilfully provoking 
communication and social media strategy led to an increase in polarization in the German party 
system. However, the AfD’s influence on the party system is, at least for the moment, 
somewhat limited because of the strict exclusion by other parties to form coalitions, inner 
tensions, and scandals within the AfD that weakens its current standing in the system of parties, 
and competition for voters that only elected the AfD temporarily for protest reasons. 
The case study by Jaume Magre, Lluís Medir, and Esther Pano focuses on the party system in 
Spain and its changes after the recent emergence of two main populist parties – Vox and Unidas 
Podemos. Two Spanish populist formations emerged in 2014 due to the severe and protracted 
economic crisis endured by broad layers of Spanish society and to the observation that the 
traditional parties were incapable of channelling the indignation of the citizens. The appearance 
of the two populist parties has entailed a greater fragmentation of the party system, an increase 
in electoral volatility and, above all, a very notable increase in political polarization. The 
polarization has been channelled, especially by VOX, through the reintroduction of classic 
issues which have divided Spanish society. They are unresolved issues, many of which are 
popular among the most radical right wing. The authors conclude that although it is true the 
Spanish populist parties have been able to reintroduce issues onto the agenda which have 
polarized political debate, the perception that the citizens have of the position of the parties on 
the left-right axis has not become polarized. In this respect, they fail in modifying the position 
of the parties in the system in a centrifugal sense. 
The following chapter by Michal Kubát analyses the Czech party system and its shift from 
quasi-polarized to true polarized pluralism. In the analysed period, populism significantly 
increased party polarization and the centrifugal tendencies of party competition in the country. 
This mainly concerns the ANO movement of Andrej Babiš, which represents a specific variant 
of ‘technocratic’ or ‘managerial’ populism. Accompanied by other types of populism, 




represented by the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), ANO managed to impose some degree of populism on other 
parties, considered as ‘traditional’. The rise of the SPD and the relative electoral stability of 
the KSČM brought the country closer to the existence of a dangerous bilateral anti-system 
opposition. The Czech party system, which even before was close to polarized pluralism, has 
now become a true polarized pluralism. In other words, it has transformed from extended 
multipartyism with a bipolar degree of competition to extended multipartyism with a multipolar 
degree of competition. The author pointed out the decisive factor in the Czech case is precisely 
the polarization or ideological distance between the parties, which populism has increased in 
an unprecedented way. 
Martin Baloge and Nicolas Hubé deal with the populist parties in the French party system and 
their structural effect on the Fifth French Republic. They pointed out that the party system in 
France is characterized by the force of inertia that the National Rally exerts on other political 
organizations. As a result of presidentialism, the French party system is very polarized between 
an extreme left and an extreme right whose only point of convergence is the criticism of the 
elites. But these parties, although polarized, do not have the same force of attraction, nor the 
same electoral dynamics. By making the National Rally its designated enemy, while adopting 
similar positions on certain issues, Emmanuel Macron has contributed to shifting and 
attenuating political lines of division. In a sense, populist rhetoric is becoming an electoral tool 
for catch-all parties, especially in France, where the Front National has been an important 
political actor in the political arena since the 1990s. Its role in the structure of the field 
contributes to a reshaping of the common political agenda. The French partisan system 
therefore faces many challenges. The very high level of political mistrust encountered by 
political parties is evidence of a deep institutional crisis. Political parties are largely in the last 
place in polls on confidence in political institutions and organizations. Neither the rise of 
populism nor the strategies of mainstream parties seem to have limited this mistrust. 
The final case study, written by Andrej Školkay, focuses on the Slovak party system and its 
fundamental changes. The author shows a constant support for populist parties with the only 
change showing the number of voters who supported parties with identifiable ideology and 
using populist rhetoric has doubled, while support for borderline cases has decreased. In that 
sense ideologically backed polarisation in Slovakia has increased. In all cases, periods, or 
blocks, as put by Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009), Slovakia exhibits a long-term ‘clean–




corrupt’ issue divide. This is, in essence, the typical substance of populism. Concurrently, it 
also indicates problems with country governance at different levels that as a boomerang lead 
back to the re-emergence of new populist saviours. However, at the political party level, the 
electoral system seems to be a major obstacle in the development of a more ideologically and 
less leader-based party system. New party challengers often exploit some niche and salient 
issues, of which the most durable was grand corruption or, more precisely, the partially 
captured state. 
3.1 Populist Parties and Party Systems 
The analyses of selected European party systems show similar pattern in which populist move 
in political arena. This has been proved by testing above-mentioned four hypotheses in 
different clusters. 
Testing of the Representation gap hypothesis, populist parties in all democracy clusters clearly 
pursue a strategy exploiting gaps of representation by bringing up new issues or re-inventing 
old ones. In Hungary, for example, Jobbik thematizes the Roma question and Fidesz exploits 
the migrant issue in a similar way. Polish Law and Justice aims to use socioeconomic 
differences in Poland and seek to represent so-called Poland B (the more traditional, more 
religious eastern part of the country). In Greece, Syriza appealed to social groups dissatisfied 
with economic austerity policies. In Spain, Vox is exploiting gap in nativist topics (migration, 
territorial unity) and Podemos is seeking to use socioeconomical consequences from the 
economic crisis (however, their populist content is gradually decreasing). German AfD is 
filling the representation gap by attracting voters with Eurosceptic and nativist and extremist 
rhetoric. In Slovakia, populists exploited gaps of representation on poor measures against grand 
corruption and the partially captured state in the case of Ordinary People and on migration in 
the case of We Are Family. 
Concerning the second hypothesis (contagion), the results showed more differences between 
countries. The cluster of party system with the strongest populist presence shows that their 
position is so strong and polarizing that it basically impedes further contagion to non-populist 
actors. In Hungary, the diffusion of populist ideas can be described rather as a process between 
populist parties but not with non-populist actors. Polish case studies demonstrate similar 
conclusions – PiS is competing with more radical fringe parties but not with their non-populist 
adversaries. In Greece, defenders of austerity policy were not on speaking terms, literally, with 




those who rejected such a policy. Parties of either side thus did not borrow ideas in the policy 
agenda from the opposite side, so contagion and diffusion of populist ideas was hard to come 
by.  
In the second, less populist dominant cluster, the situation is different. In Spain – Vox has 
notable contact points with other conservative forces regarding topics such as the concept of 
family, freedom of choice concerning education, liberal positions concerning fiscal policy or 
the approach towards historical memory. Podemos, on the other hand, did not succeed in 
spreading their original criticism of Europe as the cause of the neoliberal shift leading to the 
economic degradation of Spain (Podemos has since gradually discarded its populist content 
with the passing of the years). In Germany, the AfD forced almost all established parties to 
shift to the right regarding their cultural left-right dimension. In the Czech case, the two former 
largest establishment parties even partially adopted populist rhetoric – the Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS) mimics populist attitudes in topics such as Euroscepticism or the refusal of not 
clearly defined ‘liberal progressivism’; the Czech Social Democratic Party, on the other side 
of the political spectrum, combines anti-immigration attitudes and social populism. 
In France, there is a long history of adopting populist styles and rhetoric in the political 
mainstream. Currently, it could be noticeable in the anti-media discourse or in the rejection of 
the elites which seems to be common to all French political parties and can be considered as a 
sign of the ideological impact that the LFI and the FN/RN have had on the French party system. 
In Slovakia, there has been a clear distinction between populist and ‘programme’ parties 
(ideologically and more clearly profiled parties, which mostly belong to European party groups 
of various ideological orientations and are therefore the opposite of populist parties). The 
political agenda of the program parties was mostly firmly profiled and anchored, and populism 
usually did not occur in it and therefore could not have a significant positive effect on the 
strengthening of populist parties. 
As for polarization hypotheses, all party systems manifest an increase in polarization. In all 
selected cases studies, the polarization level of the parliament has increased, in some case like 
in Hungary, quite significantly (from 9.6 to 25.0 between 2002 and 2018). In Poland, the strong 
polarization has been caused by so called ‘post-communist cleavage’ – PiS skilfully reframed 
the cleavage into the division between social and liberal Poland not only maintaining but even 
strengthening the existing polarization. In Spain, the main cause for an acute increase in 
polarization were the appearance of the new radical right-wing party, VOX, and the creation 




of a system of two blocks in which the differences between the left and the right interacted with 
the Catalan territorial crisis. In the Czech Republic, another feature of populism contributed to 
an increase in polarization – growing ideological distance between the governmental (populist) 
parties and the opposition. In France, the growing polarization is connected more to the form 
of government of the Fifth Republic – a semi-presidential regime together with the voting 
system that overrepresents establishment parties and puts extreme and populist parties in 
constant opposition which leads to increasing levels of their polarization which in turn 
influences the whole party system.  
The last hypothesis, coalition elective affinity, produces mixed results. These results are based 
on political contexts, voting systems and on relative strength of populist actors. Where 
populists are used to governing alone, and the voting system allows them to obtain the majority, 
they do not need to seek a coalition partner, they in fact show very low elective affinity (in the 
case of Fidesz in Hungary). In Poland, Law and Justice is also relatively strong but shy of an 
absolute majority. The Polish political system is based on coalition government – in this context 
ideological outbidding between coalition parties over populism and right-wing credentials 
tends to happen occasionally, thus increasing the level of polarization. A similar situation is 
valid also for Greece and Spain. The Spanish case is interesting due to its long-term experience 
with stable bipartism – only after the emergence of new populist parties, Spain’s two main 
populist political forces adapted to the spatial theories of the left-right dimension and reach 
agreements with parties which are ideologically close to them (Podemos with PSOE and VOX 
with PP and Ciudadanos). In the Czech case, the technocratic aspect of the ANO movement 
helped Andrej Babiš to form a coalition government twice already. However, in recent years 
with rising polarization, his coalition potential is gradually declining. 
AfD in Germany manifests a very low level of elective affinity. The party did not yet engage 
in coalitions with other non-populist parties, even with those that employ populist discourse 
schemes. The AfD was not able to form any coalition yet, neither at the federal nor at the state 
level, mostly because other parties strictly reject it and build around the AfD an effective 
cordon sanitaire. The French party system shows a similar level of elective affinity for populist 
actors as the German one, but for completely different reasons. As explained above, the specific 
French voting system does not favour parliamentary coalitions, thus political parties are not 
forced to collaborate (local and regional elections, on the other hand, are more favourable to 
coalition governments). A completely different situation applies for the Slovak party system – 




the level of fragmentation in the parliament is very high but due to an increased level of 
polarization it is hard for political parties to have more than one option for creating a coalition. 
In this case it would be right to talk more about a lack of available alternatives and less about 
elective affinity. 
The table below shows all the analysed party system in comparative perspective: 
Table 3: Party Systems in eight European countries 
 Represent. gap Contagion Polarization Elective affinity 
Hungary Yes No Yes No 
Poland Yes No Yes Yes 
Greece Yes No Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes Yes No 
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Czech Rep. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes Yes No 
Slovakia Yes No Yes Yes 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper analysed the impact of populism on party systems in selected countries. Based on 
the theoretical framework adapted from the theory of party systems of Giovanni Sartori, eight 
case studies have been conducted in four clusters based on the shift in support for populist 
parties in the defined period (2000-2020). By testing four hypotheses on these cases, we found 
that populist parties and movements behave in certain aspects almost the same regardless the 
political context, relative strength, or importance of non-populist actors. All analysed populist 
pursued a strategy designed to exploit gap of representation in their party systems and pick up 
issues which have been neglected by other political representants. All selected party systems 
also manifested in the examined period an increased level of polarization – various populist 
actors behave differently but the result was always the same, an increase in polarization. 
Countries with strong and gradually reinforcing level of populism (Hungary, Poland, Greece) 
showed very low level of diffusion of populist ideas in the policy agenda of non-populist 
parties. On the other hand, the second cluster of party systems (German, Spain, Czech 
Republic) manifested higher level of contagion of populist ideas into the system. The most 
divided hypothesis has been the elective affinity coalition. The results there did not correspond 
with pre-set clusters and were based more on the political context, voting system, and local 




political customs of each country. Last but not least, Slovakia was a special case which did not 
fit entirely to one of the categories, however, even this least similar case of a party system 
showed a lot of similarities to other cases.  
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